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I. !~!8QQ~£!!Q~ 
1. When adopting, on 30 September 1981 in Luxembourg, the motion for a 
resolution contained in the Insanally report on the Fifth Annual Report 
of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers, the Consultative Assembly called 
on the Joint Committee to set up a working party on the impact of the 
chapter on industrial cooperation in the context of the Lorn~ l Convention 
and the prospects for Lome II. The Joint Committee set up this working 
party on 3 February 1982 in Harare (Salisbury). 
2. The working party met for the first time in Harare on 3 and 4 February 
1982, then in Brussels on 28 and 29 June, 21 and 22 and then 27 and 28 
September, and 22 and 23 November 1982,and on 20 and 21 January 1983. 
It decided to draw up a report reviewing ACP-EEC industrial cooperation 
on the basis of the existing industrial situations and putting forward 
proposals to remedy the shortcomings which had been identified. 
3. This report must aim to serve as a reference document both for the 
opening of negotiations for the renewal of the Lome Convention and with 
a view to deliberations on the continuation of the North-South negotiations. 
4. It forms part of a general policy which aims to make ACP-EEC relations 
exemplary for relations between North and South, rejecting any posture 
of confrontation and seeking rather to place the machinery of cooperation 
in the service of social justice, human dignity and peace. 
5. The development process presupposes that the countries of the Third 
World will no longer be mere suppliers of mineral and vegetable raw 
materials but will also become full partners in the international economic 
system. For this to happen, they must industrialize, a process which 
may be speeded up through cooperation with the rest of the world. 
6. However, this cooperation - with states or groups of states - is feasible 
only if the concept of strict political equality is recognized. Only in 
this context can the least-developed partner genuinely increase its freedom 
to choose the type of development suited to its own situation and traditions. 
-2 - CA/CP/337/rev. 
7. In the case of Africa, the Lagos Plan adopted at the OAU economic 
summit in April 1980 accordingly states that 'The member countries 
consider cooperation with the other regions of the world to be 
essential for the achievement of the objective of industrial development. 
However, they stress that this cooperation must be of mutual benefit.' 
8. The plan proposed by CARICOM reflects the same desire for cooperation 
with regard to the Caribbean. 
9. In more specific terms, industrial cooperation as part of a global 
development strategy must enable the ACP gradually to meet, from their 
own resources, an increasing proportion of the needs of their popula-
tions, in particular those which they consider to be basic. This will 
entail an increase in their share of world industrial production. 
1~ Industrial cooperation must help to create jobs in order to generate 
wealth and distribute additional purchasing power. It must be designed 
to help the social integration of the ever-increasing urban population, 
while at the same time helping to curb the rural exodus by encouraging 
the existing excess population to remain on the land. 
11. Finally, it must promote the creation of a basis for the development 
of other sectors of the economy and help to promote technological 
progress with a view to the controlled modernization of society. 
12. Since the industrialization of the Third World is inevitable, it is in 
the Community's interest to steer between laisser-faire and protectionist 
approaches and seek to establish cooperation and contractual relations 
which will make the necessary changes in its production machinery and 
hence in the nature of employment in the Member States making both more 
predictable and therefore more capable of being controlled. 
13. Furthermore, an increase in the standard of living of the Third World 
through industrialization is likely to bring about a recovery in world 
demand <particularly for capital goods) and could therefore be a decisive 
factor in reducing .the present risks of a. recessive spiral and encouraging 
a lasting solution to the current economic crisis. 
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14. Any impr9vement in the standard of living, incomes and social welfare 
in the developing countries may also, in the longer term, reduce some 
competiti~e pressures by aligning manufacturing conditions. Clearly, 
it is in the interests of the Europeans, and particularly of workers, 
for conditions to be aligned upwards. 
15. As regards trade, ACP-EEC industrial cooperation may also help the 
Community to retain the large share of the market which it often 
holds in these countries, and even to increase its exports of capital 
goods and hence create jobs. 
16. Finally, as the era of colonial exploitation is over and as the 
Community is heavily dependent on imports of the raw materials 
necessary for its development <75X as against under 25X for the 
USA and under 10X for the USSR>, cooperation with the Third World, 
notably with the ACP, which have extensive resources in this field, 
is essential. 
III. !~~-~~e~§_!~Q~§!B!~b-§!!~~!!Q~-~~Q_!!§_eBQ§e~~!§_!~-B~b~!!Q~_!Q_!~~ 
B~§!_Qf_!~~-~QBbQ 
17. One point which must be made at the outset is that there are virtually 
no global statistics which could be used as a basis for assessing 
·the industrial situation of the ACP as a whole. This is undoubtedly 
attributable in part to the lack of statistics in some ACP countries 
themselves. However, it would appear that the Community for its 
part has not yet accorded this problem the importance it deserves. 
18. A second point to note is the use of the word 'industry', whose meaning 
is more or less broad according to the sources using it: sometimes it 
includes the extractive industries and energy and certain peripheral 
infrastructures. Unless otherwise stated, the term 'manufactured 
added value' will be used to cover industry in the strict sense of the 
word <section 3 of the standard international classification by industry). 1 
1
source: United Nations publication 71, XVII, 8 
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19. One thing which does emerge from UNIDO statistics is that Africa, 
where most of the ACP industry is located, accounts for only·a very 
small proportion of world manufactured added value <0.92~ in 1981 as 
against 10.3~ for the developing countries as a whole) and its share 
is increasing only very slowly <0.72~ in 1960 as against 8~ for the 
developing countries as a whole>. 1 
20. In most of the ACP countries industrial production shows little 
diversification, being concentrated in three sectors: foodstuffs, 
beverages and manufactured textiles. In some cases there is also a 
sizeable extractive industry <oil, phosphates, uranium, various metals). 
21. However, the African continent is rich in potential. Mention has 
already been made of raw materials, but it is also rich as regards 
energy, particularly the new and renewable energies - biomass, 
hydro-electricity- which could become available in large quantities 
at low prices in the near future. Finally, the population structure 
of Africa, which is often represented as a disadvantage, for instance 
where food is concerned, offers enormous potential in the longer term 
<the population of sub-Saharan Africa will undoubtedly increase from 
302 to 544 million people between 1975 and the end of the century>. 2 
22. However, there are major disparities in the above situation. Of the 
42 developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa for example: - five 
(Swaziland, Mauritius, Ivory Coast, Kenya,Zimbabwe) have a manufactured 
added value of over 15% of GOP (1976 figures>; 18 have a manufactured 
added value of less than 8~; - six (Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Ghana, 
Zimbabwe, Sudan, Kenya) together account for half the total manufactured 
added value; and 23 others each have a fuanufactured added value of unde~ 1~. 
. J 
- in cnly seven cCU\tries· <Galxn, Swazi lard, Nigeria, Ccrgo, Mauritius, Botswana, fllaurit.ania) 
was the average a-rual· rate of grcwth of marufactured ack:led value CNer 1lt' (the Lima 
cbjective - see belcw.) between 1970 and 1976. 
1
source: A statistical review of the world industrial situation 1981 
(UNIDO, Feb. 1982) 
2source: Facing the Future (OECD 1979) 
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23. These disparities are only partly due to demographic differences <of the 
61 ACP States, 8 have a population of more than 10 million- only Nigeria 
exceeding 70 million- while 19 have less than 500,000) or geographical 
differences (21 States are islands and 15are landlocked, with all that 
this entails>, although these obviously do affect the conditions in 
which industrialization takes place. 
24 •. Leaving aside other points,which will be dealt with later, these 
factors alone show that the problem of industrialization in the ACP 
• States certainly takes very different forms depending on the country 
concerned. The type of industrial cooperation to be introduced must 
also therefore be fairly flexible to take account of this diversity. 
25. The Third World's development prospects between now and the end of 
the century have been studied by various bodies from three different 
perspectives. The World Bank has made fairly optimistic projections 
on the basis of present economic trends. UNIDO has proposed an 
approach aimed at achieving the objectives laid down at the Lima 
Conference (1975), namely that the developing countries should 
account for 25X of the world's industrial production by the year 
2000. Finally, as part of its Interfutures project, the OECD carried 
out a study of possible scenarios, putting forward various economic 
and political hypotheses. Of course, none of these three studies 
should be interpreted as a forecast. Each advances a possible or 
·desirable development and calls on the political authorities to steer 
away from it or towards it on the basis of the specific objectives 
of their respective countries. 
26. The World Bank's projections1 show that between 1980 and 1990 the 
rate of growth of per capita GNP for those countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa which import oil will in all probability be more than one 
percentage point Lower than the average for 1960-1980, while oil 
exporting countries will only be able to maintain the average rate of 
growth. Furthermore, the rate of growth in the net flow of funds 
to the developing countries, which averaged 7.8X between 1970 and 1980, 
is predicted to be between - 0.2X and 3.2X from 1980 to 1990. Although 
these projections do not apply to industrial production as such, they 
clearly outline the prospect of somewhat slower growth in this area. 
1 . Source: Report on development in the world, 1981 
<World Bank, August 1981> 
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27. In comparison, the voluntary approach advocated by UNID01, which would 
mean a 2 per cent share for Africa in world industrial production by 
the year 2000, presupposes an increase in the rate of growth of production 
above the average for the period 1960-1980. It also assumes a large 
increase in the annual flow of direct foreign investment in industry by 
the year 2000. Although the UNIDO approach is still credible for certain 
newly industrialized countries in the Third World, it no longer appears 
to offer realistic prospects for Africa. 
28. Finally, of the various scenarios envisaged in Interfutures2, the two 
most extreme- 'A', the most optimistic, entailing optimum cooperation 
between states, and •c•, involving North-South confrontation- indicate 
an increase in the proportion of total world manufactured added value 
accounted for by sub-Saharan Africa from 0.5~ in 1970 to 0.8% and 0.7~ 
respectively in the year 2000 (16.4% and 19.1% for the Third World as 
a whole: the North-South confrontation scenario would thus lead to a 
greater share for the developing countries in world industry, but the 
total level of production is far lower in scenario •c• than in scenario 
I A I). 
29. None of the abovementioned projections would therefore appear to afford 
bright prospects for the participation of sub-Saharan Africa - and 
consequently a large number of ACP States - in the world industrial 
system of the future. However, it should be noted that, even within 
the context of the Interfutures scenarios, the figures of 0.7% and 0.8% 
apply to very different levels of world activity but nonetheless reflect 
variations in industrial production levels which can be as great as 70% 
or 80%. In terms of the creation of wealth and the satisfaction of 
needs, the difference is considerable, with the result that the analysis 
of both the obstacles to industrialization and the means of overcoming 
these, i.e., the search for an optimum strategy for industrialization 
and industrial cooperation is fully justified • 
1
source: Industry 2000 -New Perspectives (UNIDO, 1981) 
2source: Facing the Future (Op. cit.) 
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30· The first difficulty arises from the low internal wealth accumulation 
capacity of many Third World countries, which still derive most of 
their income from the sale of raw materials. The general deterioration 
in the terms of trade for non-oil products, which has been accentuated 
in recent years by a slackening of demand in the rich countries, has 
reduced the real value of these revenues (e.g., copper for Zambia, 
uranium for Niger). Only progress at international level - initiation 
of global negotiations, introduction of the Common Fund - can reverse 
these trends. 
3'1. The above situation is aggravated still further by sharp fluctuations 
in commodity prices which are sometimes caused by climatic or social 
changes but often also by speculation on the part of a few large-scale 
international operators, and this makes it difficult to forecast 
accurately the inflow of foreign currency and hence to prepare medium 
and long-term investment programmes. (By way of example, between 1973 
and 1982, the price of cocoa fluctuated on a scale of 1 to 10, that of 
+ 
sugar 1 to 7, and that of copper 1 to 2 ). 
32. Another difficulty is that the increase in the potential added value of 
resources on and below the earth's surface often still accrues to 
foreign firms even though the latter may no longer own the resources. 
These firms are more interested in repatriating short-term profits than 
in participating in the construction of a coherent industrial structure. 
33. The most extreme attitude of this kind is that of multinational firms 
which invest in a country in order to benefit from low wage costs or 
tax advantages <which often take the form of 'free zones') but produce 
goods which meet none of the needs of the host country and are virtually 
all re-exported. 
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Without wishing systematically to condemn al~ situations of this kind, 
which may have positive repercussions in the case of very small or 
island states in particular, it must be recognized that the 'industrializa-
. tion'already achieved represents an artificial veneer rather than a basic 
contribution and that, in this case as in the previous one, the local 
authorities find it difficult to direct activities over which they have 
virtually no control. 
34. In general, therefore, industrial development is heavily dependent on 
foreign investment. However, this is now being cut back becauseof the 
level of indebtedness, which is already often too high <see Table 1>, 
resulting from a high degree of dependence on imported food and energy 
to meet what are rightly considered to be priority requirements. The 
solutions proposed by the international monetary institutions are also 
far too much dictated by short-term financial considerations and do not 
take sufficient account of the general problems of development. 
35. Another kind of difficulty can emerge when certain foreign countries 
announce that a given firm, which was due to set up in a Third World 
country and was intended to export part of its production, on a competitive bas;s, 
cannot do so or can do so only on a very reduced scale in that pa-rticular 
locality. Situations of this kind have already arisen even in the 
context of ACP-EEC relations, for example in the field of textiles, 
in spite of the letter and spirit of the Lome Convention. This raises 
the problem of external markets for certain goods manufactured in the 
developing countries. 
36. Underlying this attitude is a fear which is increasingly felt and 
expressed by the rich countries in the present crisis, namely that 
the industrialization of the developing countries could lead to a 
deterioration in the already serious employment situation. This 
concern, which is rightly felt by the workers who may lose their jobs 
and for which there are sometimes good grounds, could have an increasingly 
serious effect on North-South relations in general and ACP-EEC relations 
in particular. 
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37. An analysis of the trade flows between the Community and the developing 
countries shows, however, that the Community has a strong positive 
balance of trade in manufactured products (in 1980, 46.2 thousand million 
ECU with the developing countries as a whole, 9.5 thousand million ECU of 
this with the ACP countries alone, giving a ratio of exports over imports 
respectively of 3.3 and 5.4- see Table II). It is clear from this that 
in a global if not a regional or sectoral perspective, present trade 
patterns in industrial goods create considerably more jobs than they 
destroy in the Community <although a direct correlation cannot be made 
between trade and employment in view of the varying job content involved 
in the production of the goods traded). 
38. In addition, it must be remembered that the ACP still account for 
only a small proportion of Community imports <1% of textile imports 
in 1980 and 1981) in the case of the most sensitive sectors and 
products (textiles, electronics>, and are therefore no threat to Community 
employment. 
39. Basically, the problem is one of acceptance by the North - notably 
the Community - of a different international division of labour which 
would give more weight in the long term to industry in the developing countries 
and particularly in the ACP. A medium- and Long-ternapproach-~fs._necessary-
if the possibility of such a development without which any dfscussion on 
development will be meaningless, is to be considered. If it is to be 
approved by everyone, this approach must be worked out not only among 
states enjoying equal rights but also with the involvement of all the 
social partners, and particularly the workers. 
40. The first difficulty of this kind relates to the ambitious nature of 
the objectives set, namely to enable societies which are still predomi-
nantly rural, agrarian or pastoral to achieve a genuine industrial 
take-off in, historically speaking, an amazingly short period of time. 
The problem is that, even in the best of cases, virtually all the 
industrial structures which existed at the time of decolonization were 
designed with a view to exporting to the mother country and it was the 
interests of the Latter alone which dictated where the investment was made, 
be it in research or infrastructures. 
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41. Another difficulty is the weakness of existing conditions: 
- in the field of transport and communications, where the present 
set-up is still based mainly on the sQ_~~!rs demands of the colonial 
era; 
- in the industrial field, too, which means that many materials needed 
by firms, including the most basic spare parts, must still very often 
be imported. 
This situation is aggravated in many cases by the topography of the 
countries concerned (size, landlocked, or island situation). 
42. The small population of certain countries often makes it difficult to introduce 
the mass production techniques applied in the advanced countries, particularly 
as a large section of the population does not have the minimum purchasing 
power necessary to acquire manufactured goods. This is frequently the case 
with the rural population, which nevertheless constitutes the majority. 
43. The establishment of effective regional industrial ~nd trade cooperation in 
response to this problem often faces political or administrative 
difficulties - in what state should the headquarters of the cooperative 
firm be located, what should be a fair return for each participant, etc? -
which the Community Member States know only too well and which can be 
overcome only with experience and time. 
44. The introduction of a training system capable of supporting industrial 
development <training of company managers willing to accept the risks 
inherent in such undertakings and technicians at different levels, as 
well as basic education and general literacy) is undoubtedly one of the 
most difficult tasks. Progress is slowest in the cultural field, 
particularly if the intention is to take account of local features and 
traditions without abandoning the idea of creating the competitive 
capacity without which foreign dominance will still prevail. 
45. One final point, which is in part a result of the previous one, is 
the difficulty of using techniques or technologies developed in the 
industrialized countries for a specific economic, social and cultural 
environment where there is a well-established traditional industrial 
work force. As well as being too large-scale in many cases, a fact which 
has already been mentioned, these technologies are generally designed 
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with maximum labour savings in mind, whereas the developing countries 
have an abundance of manpower, are often unnecessarily sophisticated 
for the manufacture of goods intended to satisfy basic requirements, 
and require specialists, of whom there are still only a very small 
number in the Third World, to maintain or repair them. As a result; 
and following the interest shown in the problem of finding better ways 
of carrying out major technology transfers, a productive yet ambiguous 
debate has begun on the concept of 'suitable technologies'. 
46. Title V of Lorn~ II, which superseded the Lo~ I Convention, accords 
considerable importance to industrial cooperation, stating that 
'The Community and ACP States, acknowledging the pressing need to 
promote the industrial development of the ACP States, agree to take all 
measures necessary to bring about effective industrial cooperation' 
<Article 65). It then goes on to say that this cooperation is intended 
'to promote new relations of dynamic complementarity between the 
Community and the ACP States' (Article 66). 
4 ~ In order to achieve these objectives, the Lome Conventions made 
provision for. the use of part of the funds earmarked for financial and 
technical cooperation- 3,700 m ECU for Lom6 i, and 5,700 ~--ECU-for Lorn' 
ii ~which are administered by the Comm~ssion or the EI~and ~or~the cre~tion 
of--a Commit"tee on Industrial Cooperation and a Centre for Industrial Development. 
4·8. Industrial cooperation can be financed by the Commission through 
/ 
subsidies, special loans <at an interest rate of 1%> and, since Lome 
II, Sysmin. The funds administered by the EIB are venture capital, 
loans from own resources at subsidized interest rates (with an 8% 
, 
ceiling; subsidies from EDF resources> and, since Lome II, common-
, 
interest mining loans <not subsidized). Table II sets out for Lome 
I and II the amounts allocated to these different lines. 
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49. The main role of the Comm~ttee on Industrial Cooperation appointed by the 
ACP-EEC Council of Ministers with an equal number of representatives from 
each side, is to 'review the progress in the implementation of the overall 
programme of industrial cooperation' and also 'organize ••• a review of trends 
••• with a view to exchanging information necessary for improving industrial 
cooperation' (Article 78>. It consists mainly of experts and officials. 
SO. The Centre f~r Industrial Development <CID) 'shall help ••• to establish 
and strengthen industrial undertakings in the ACP States, ••• special 
emphasis shall be placed on the identificatlon and exploitation of 
possibilities of joint ventures' <Article 79>. It was set up in 1977 
and has been operating for little more than a year with increased 
, . 
resources under the Lome II Convent1on. 
51. The number of ventures to further industrialization <including energy 
and mining> involving Community financing stands at 149 for Lome I 
and 39 for the first 18 months of the Lome II Convention in the case of 
the Commission, and 245 for Lome I and 39 for the first 18 months of 
Lome II in the case of the EIB. In addition to these figures, tables 
IV and v show the proportion of industrial cooperation financing 
accounted for by the various types of resources and the percentage of 
the different categories of funding allocated to this form of cooperation 
as against the level of commitments. These figures also show that 29.0X 
of commitments under Lome I and 35.6X of those under Lome II <at 30 June 1982> 
related to industrial projects <in the broad sense of the term indicated 
abovez. the figures for industry are strictly speaking less favourable, as 
will be shown>. 
52. The breakdown by sector of these projects shows, apart from the dominant 
ones of energy and mining, a high concentration in the agricultural 
processing industries, both in terms of number and volume of resources 
committed. This supplements the analysis of the situation which we gave 
in paragraph 20 (again, see Tables IV and V>. 
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53. The breakdown by country is to be read at two very different levels. 
With regard to programme aid, it merely reflects the results of 
negotiations and the very broad priorities of the Lom' Conventions 
<priority to the least-developed countries for non-repayable aid, for 
example, or percentage allocated to operations of a regional nature). 
More significant is the breakdown of EIB loans, which reflects more 
clearly the particular dynamism of certain states; Table VI shows, 
for instance, that under Lome I, four states <Kenya, Nigeria, the 
Ivory Coast and Cameroon) have alone used almost 40% of all the funds 
administered by the Bank, while three others (Mauritania, Fiji and 
Togo) have used a further 15X; (it should, however, be observed that 
these countries have, for the moment, received only 8.4 and 5.4% 
respectively of the total resources administered by the EIB under 
Lome II; see Table VII). 
54. The CID has set up a department responsible for missions and inspection 
visits by experts <45 countries were visited in 1981) to help identify 
possible operations. These vary from helping to establish new industries 
<generally in the form of joint ventures) to technical assistance or 
rehabilitation operation. At the end of 1981, then, the IDC was involved 
in 77 operations <a detailed account of these operations is given in 
Table VIII). 
55. In looking at the achievements it is also worth mentioning the allocation 
of financing as between specific industrial projects, generally involving 
large-scale investments at least in terms of the countries concerned, 
and small and medium-sized industries, which is particularly useful to 
the small countries and also in helping to secure balanced regional 
development. The latter type of aid generally takes the form of 
'global Loans' to Development Banks or local or regional financial 
institutions. These Loans are then allocated to the individual SME-
SMI <loans over 20,000 ECU administered by the EIB, those under 20,000 
by the Commission>, either .· in the form of funding for investment 
projects, or as direct participation in the undertakings, or, again, 
to finance studies. The impo~tance and allocation of these loans is 
illustrated in Tables IX.and X. Th~y ~epresent a little over 10X of 
the volume of industrial commitment and show an increase from Lome I 
to Lo~ II deriving from growth in the volume of available risk capital. 
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56. The impact of industrial operations financed by the EEC under the 
Lome Convention may be gauged by considering the following figures 
for invervention involving the EIB (at 30 June 1982, excluding 
projects financed by the Development Banks>: 
- average direct additional added value created in ACP industry 
<excluding energy) was 870 m eeu per annum in 1982 <out of a 
total of 17,000 m, including 4,000 m for Nigeria); 
- the net impact of the same projects on the ACP balance of payments 
was a gain of 584,000 m ECU per annum in 1982 <compared with a 
deficit of 4,200 m including Nigeria; and 7,300 m excluding Nigeria); 
- energy projects achieved savings of approximately 260,000 m ECU 
per annum, the equivalent of 5X of ACP oil imports. 
57. One final point of interest in assessing the results is the snowball 
effect of the Community's financial contributions. This is to be seen 
in particular in the number of co-financing operations they have 
engendered and the contribution of other donors to such operations. 
As Tables XI and XII show, 65 industrial projects (including energy 
and mining), representing a Little over two-thirds of commitments 
under Industrial Cooperation, were developed as co-financing operations, 
the Community Institutions' share accounting for 15.9X of the total 
investment (it should be noted that in the case of global Loans, which 
almost always form part of co-financing arrangements, the Community 
Institutions' share in the total investment is 25X: see also Table X). 
58. In spite of the considerable achievements mentioned above, it has 
none the Less to be recognized that their impact is generally regarded 
as disappointing by the ACP, which often hope for more and sometimes 
expect something different. This kind of reaction can be justified by 
the trend of Community imports of manufactured products from the ACP 
countries, although this is clearly a rather debated point; in spite 
of the abolition of all customs duties and, theoretically at Least, 
all quotas for these products (Articles 2 and 3 of the Lom~ II 
Convention>, the ACP share of Community imports has remained very Low 
and has actually declined (from 2.6X to 2% between 1975 and 1980), 
whereas, conversely, the share of manufactured goods in ACP exports to 
the EEC has clearly diminished (from 14.3X to 11.4X between 1975 and 1980, 
although the non-oil percentages are admittedly Less convincing: see 
Table XIII). 
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59, One of the main reasons put forward by the ACP to explain this 
phenomenon is the lack of funding for industrial cooperation. The 
following remarks may be made in this connection: 
- the level of funding for general industrial cooperation between rich 
countries and Third World countries has been hit in recent years by 
the financing difficulties experienced by major international 
institutions, notably the World Bank <which has rightly decided to 
give priority to agriculture>; these difficulties have been due 
partly to a lack of good-will in certain countries (e.g. the 
reduction in the Unites States' contribution to aid) and partly to 
the general rise in interest rates; 
/ 
- although a significant proportion of the resources under the Lome 
Convention is allocated to industrial cooperation in the broad sense 
of the term (see paragraph sn>, more detailed analysis of the figures 
in Tables IV and V shows a less positive picture. The 'general' line 
includes 'peripheral' investments, which do not really cover industry; 
furthermore, leaving aside energy and mining, it is clear that the 
percentage allocated to industry in the strict sense of the term is 
16.4% of the current commitment appropriations under Lome I <the figure 
for Lorn~ II cannot yet.be regarded as significant>; 
- One of the commitments under the Lorn~ II Convention, namely,'to 
carry out a detailed joint analysis .•• of ways of obtaining additional 
resources' (Annex X of the Convention), has not yet been implemented, 
and yet Annex X clearly states that this analysis should be 
'completed in the shortest possible time, which should not exceed a 
period of 9 months after the signing of the Convention.' However, a 
group of experts under the chairmanship of Professor Onitiri submitted 
a report on complementary financing to the ACP-EEC Committee of 
Ambassadors on 12 March 1981; although the Commission and the ACP 
States have produced a number of documents in response to this report, 
it is still being considered by the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers. 
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60· However, another debate has begun between the ACP States, which feel 
that a larger number of projects could be financed with more money, 
and certain Community representatives, who consider that virtually all 
the 'good' projects have indeed been funded. The rapporteur's conclusions 
on this delicate issue are set out below: 
- the Commission is indeed in a position to absorb more funds for 
industry, as it often uses funds to finance peripheral investments 
which are not directly profitable; 
the EIB would undoubtedly find it difficult to do likewise, as 
private financing can be found without difficulty for clearly 
profitable projects; the projects presented to it are generally 
less 'good', and it is a fact that alternative sources of finance 
could not be found for the projects it rejected, as they were not 
viable; 
- the CID, on the other hand, rightly claims that small and medium-
sized firms and industries, as well as the craft trades, have the 
capacity to absorb more funas. 
61. The debate on the issue to which the above conclusions relate could 
prove to be biased for two reasons: 
- there could appear to be a lack of 'good' projects simple because, 
once the industrial 'sure things' have been established, insufficient 
attention is devoted to identifying and evaluating other projects; 
- the concept of a 'good' project raises the complex and crucial 
issue of selection criteria, which may not be the same for the 
ACP and the Community or even for governments pursuing different 
priorities. 
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6~. The EIB's selection criteria have come in for special criticism. Some 
feel that the main criterion adopted is the financial profitability of 
projects, which means that applications which perhaps may not bring an 
immediate financial return but which are genuinely useful in social 
and national terms (projects to keep the agricultural workforce on 
the land or to save foreign currency) are rejected. 
63. The EIB's reply to these arguments is: 
- that its criteria are virtually the same as those of all the 
international development organizations and those are generally accepted 
by the developing countries; 
- that, unlike the commercial banks, it is a non-profit-making body 
which first considers the likely impact of a project on the economic 
and social development of the country concerned and only after, 
that looks at the more technical and financial aspects; 
- that the initial examination of the projects proposed by the States 
takes place during the joint planning missions by the Commission and 
the Bank; 
- that the money which it lends is not its own and that, even without 
seeking to make a profit, it has to be able to repay the loans which 
it raises on the financial markets; 
- lastly, that it is not in the recipient State's own interest to 
receive support for a project which will eventually represent an 
intolerable burden. 
64. However justified the above points may be, they do not solve the 
problem altogether since, in the case of the final technical and 
financial appraisal, it can at the very least be said that: 
- although the idea of the viability of a project is important, it 
depends just as much on the policy followed by the recipient country 
as on the EIB's estimates: does a country intend to protect a certain 
newly-established undertaking by the introduction of customs duties 
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and is it prepared to accept an inadequate financial return on the 
basis of its own judgment of what is in the social or national 
interests, etc.? 
- an increase in the volume of venture capital not borrowed by the 
Bank, and to which more favourable terms are attached than those 
for loans from own resources, should make it possible to extend 
the range of eligible projects and, indeed, countries. 
65. In actual fact there is probably one, and only one, way of resolving 
the argument and difficulty discussed above: by reducing the present 
gap between 'users' and 'deciders'. One way in which this might be 
done would be to detach from the existing EIB all activities in the 
ACP States and to set up a 'Lom' Development Bank' in the administration 
of which all the ACP and EEC States could participate on the model of 
the World Bank. Such a reform would clearly have to be implemented in 
such a way that the borrowing capacity of the new institution could be 
kept at the existing level; its impact on the role of the other institutions 
should also be examined. 
66. Another reason advanced to explain the problems encountered is the 
difficulties faced by the CID. Apart from the newness of the institution, 
the main difficulties, according to the ~ID, are: 
- a lack of resources, which limits the presence and activities of the 
CIO both in the ACP and in the Community; 
-the lack of capital available to it, combined with the fact that the 
small and medium-sized industries cannot apply directly to the EIB; 
- the lack of incentives for the SMI to invest in the ACP countries, 
either directly or within joint ventures. 
67. There has also been some criticism on occasion of the shift in the 
type of funding given under Lome I and Lome II. The kind of aid which 
has increased most spectacularly under Lome II is venture capital, 
which has been virtually tripled and in fact implies a heavier financial 
burden than subsidies or special loans. This criticism may seem 
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debatable, because, on the one hand, the increase in venture capital, 
virtually all of which has been devoted to industrial cooperation, 
has helped to increase the share of funds under Lom~ II allocated to 
such cooperation <see Tables IV and V>; on the other hand, the interest 
rates applicable to these capital loans- which are not even necessarily 
repaid - seem to have been between 2X and 3X. However, there is no 
gainsaying the fact <see Tables VI and VII> that, from one Convention to 
the next, the share of EIB finances going to the least-developed ACP 
States (in the sense of Articles 48 and 155) seems to be declining. 
6a Lastly, dissatisfaction has at times been expressed regarding poor 
coordination between the European institutions involved in industrial 
cooperation; insufficient coordination vis-a-vis the CID by the 
Commission and the EIB and insufficient coordination between the latter 
two institutions. It seems that these observations, which may have 
been justified at one time or another are no longer valid today. 
69. In order to draw up an industrialization strategy, each State must 
naturally take account, first of all, of its own characteristics and 
circumstances, its assets and constraints. At the same time there are 
a number of general principles which clearly apply in nearly every 
case: thus increasing the value of the local resources - mineral or 
vegetable - by primary processing, leaves the State concerned a greater 
share of the added value which will ultimately appear in the final 
manufactured products. Over and beyond those elements which must : 
clearly be different in each case and those which are no less clearly 
of general relevance, there are some major types of strategy, based 
on differing conceptual priorities and policies, which must be borne 
in mind, with their advantages and disadvantages. 
70. The strategy of import substitution is aimed at local production of 
a number of goods used in the country concerned. It can prove of value 
if it concerns really essential goods, the non-importation of which will 
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mean savings in precious foreign currencies and which can, moreover, 
be produced in a form better suited to the country's needs <examples: 
processed food products, building materials, simple spare parts, etc.) 
However, such a strategy is often designed to satisfy a local demand 
that can already be paid for, i.e., that of privileged social minorities, 
and so it concerns above all consumer durables <motor vehicles, domestic 
electric appliances ••• ). Import substitution strategy is, particularly 
in the latter case, unsuitable for small countries with limited outlets 
in this field <save in a regional cooperation framewor~. 
71. A strategy of io!~ro~!iQD~1-~~~:£QO!!~£!iog is aimed at utilizing a 
country's comparative 'advantages' <low wages and social costs, limited 
trade union rights ••• > to set up assembly industries <electronics, 
textiles ••• ) •. Its main interests are outside the country, and finished 
products,frequently manufactured by subsidiaries of multi-national firms, 
are almost wholly re-exported. 
Its interest lies in its creation, locally, of employment, a more highly 
skilled labour force and added value; thus it can be advantageous to 
small <island) States or States adjacent to major centres of consumption. 
However, it does not generate much further activity and does not boost 
industrial development in the sense of creating intersectoral relationships; 
·~t leaves the host country extremely vulnerable to sudden closures. Until 
now it has operated mainly in Asia and some free zones in the ACP States. 
7~. A strategy of io9~~!ri~1i~iog_io9~~!ri~~ <a priority for heavy industry) 
is aimed at creating, first, a complete primary processing industry and 
then an industry producing intermediate goods. 
The advantage of such a strategy is that it can generate considerable 
intersectoral activity if its development is well planned, and quickly 
reduce the country's dependence in what are often essential fields. 
But it requires heavy investment and a skilled labour force such as are 
available only in large countries (such as Algeria and Nigeria). More-
over, it generates Little employment in its initial stages and its impact 
is slow in the consumer goods sector. Consequently, it too has practically 
no effect on rural populations. 
- 21 - CA/CP/337/rev. 
73. Lastly, the strategy of seCFreliant development is aimed--initfaCly __ _ 
at meeting genuine local needs for which the financial resources may or 
may not yet be available (basic needs). 
It seems to build up maximum (national or regional) self-sufficiency, 
which presupposes the widespread existence (among the rural population too) 
of a basic minimum purchasing power that will allow the growth of domestic 
demand. It reduces the danger of marginalizing large sections of society, 
with all its political consequences, and also presupposes strong inter-
sectoral cohesion. The disadvantage of this approach - now in the 
ascendant - is that the speed of technological modernization resulting 
from it may seem slower, even though its effects on the whole population 
are actually more profound. 
74. From among the above strategies - and not excluding, for purely 
theoretical reasons, approaches which would in fact combine elements 
from more than one of them - Africa has chosen the one which it prefers. 
In the Monrovia Declaration (1979>, reaffirmed in the Lagos Plan (1980>, 
it recognized 'the urgent need to take measures aimed at achieving the 
objective of development and rapid self-reliant growth'. ~ 
75. This option clearly implies the introduction or consolidation of regional 
and sub-regional cooperation <e.g., CEAO, ECOWAS, SADCC, etc.). This is 
particularly true of the small States in the Caribbean (where CARICOM is 
being established) and in the Pacific. 
76. It also implies abandoning the types of investment sometimes carried 
out following independence for reasons of prestige rather than 
practicality, under pressure from firms from the former colonial powers. 
It involves the accumulation of domestic capital through higher added 
value by means of primary processing, which might be achieved through a 
few large-scale projects. But is also implies the fixing of farm prices 
at a sufficiently remunerative level to permit the creation and growth 
of rural added value,thereby generating capital for a network of craft 
trades and cooperatives, SME and SMI, for the manufacture of a certain 
number of standard goods (farm implements, building materials ••• >. 
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77. It further implies the introduction of planning mechanisms to establish 
a timetable for the development of a comprehensive and rational 
industrial fabric, which would include particularly the essential 
intermediate industries <engineering, capital goods ••• >. The aim of 
such planning is not to replace market forces by rigid administrative 
dictates, but to help implement the priorities chosen (production targets 
for certain key industries, for instance> and provide information (dates 
and volume of investment projects, including infrastructure, capital 
goods, etc.> which would not otherwise be available and which would 
assist all operators in the economy in their decision-making. 
78. What, then, are the respective roles of the public and private sectors 
in this planning process? This is a choice which, more than others, 
, must be left to the discretion of the individual States. Four 
observations should, however, be made: 
- in view of the current low build-up of private resources in many 
Third World countries, a large public sector is likely to be essential; 
-however, for the same reasons, not only public foreign investment 
<large development agencies> but also private foreign investment is 
still desirable in most cases, 
- the creation of a joint sector - in both combinations: association of 
private foreign capital with ACP States capital or of public capital 
with ACP private capital (in particular in the SME-SMI) - may be one of 
the possible answers; 
- in any case, it is important that private foreign capital should be 
invested in keeping with the priorities and goals of the national 
plans. 
<c> !b~_im~!i£~!i2o~_fQr_!b~-~Qmm~oi!l~~-io9~~!ri~!-~2!i£l_~o9_io9~§!ri~! 
£QQ~~r~!i2o 
79. The first point to note here is that there is hardly any Community 
industrial policy at present <except in sectors- in most cases, those 
in difficulty- which are covered by the ECSC Treaty>. The negligible 
role played so far by the EEC~s medium-term economic planning has led 
to a de facto situation which will not make for rapid progress in the 
dialogue. 
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80. Having said this, from the Community standpoint, the choice by its 
partners of a self-s4stajning development strategy, which places 
less emphasis on foreign market outlets, represents less of a threat 
in the short-term to its existing industrial and employment structures. 
81. Certain imports from the ACP countries can, however, create problems. 
This has already been the case in the textile sector, where the Community 
has invoked Article 12 of the Convention (safeguard clause). A similar 
situation could occtir in regard to refined sugar <largely becuase the 
Community has had refining capacity sold off which far exceeded existing 
requirements or in regard to certain articles deriving from the 
sub-contracting sector. We shall return in Section VIII to possible 
., • solutions to these problems. 
82•. At all events, the nature of the flow of Community exports will have 
to be modified in the medium-term, taking into.account not only the 
industrialization of'the South but also the growth ~f ~outh-South trade: 
there will have to be a gradual shift in exports towards capital goods, 
upmarket products and advanced technology, which, as a general· rule, it 
will take the ACP States a long time to master. 
83·.. To avoid being completely overtaken by competition from the newly industrialized 
countries of the Third World, the EEC will have to ensure that the 
manufacture of many products is adapted to the technical and cultural 
requirements of its partners. This means in many cases that the design 
of these manufactures will ha~e to be a joint operation. 
84. These considerations prompt the opinion that, in future, industrial 
cooperation cannot be confined to unilateral aid, largely decided on 
the basis of moral considerations, as has been the case up to now. It 
must also include concretization of the resolve to define jointly the 
future international division of labour. This must include a description 
of the broad lines of future industrial development in all the countries 
concerned; this in turn must be based on an effort to coordinate the 
projects and plans of the individual partners, at least roughly, as 
regards location and timing. A genuine concept of mutual interest will 
have to be thus elaborated on the basis of each participant's potential 
and assets. 
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<a> Ir~9~ 
85. An examination of the practices adopted by the EEC in relation to certain 
imports of sensitive manufactured goods from the ACP States raises the 
questjon of whether, rather than juxtaposing,.without explanation, Articles 
2.and 3.of the Lom~ Convention,on the one hand~ and Articles 12.and 23 on the other, 
it would not be better to establish (in particular for textiles) a quota 
system which would allow for precisely defined percentage increases. 
8'6. The extension of the list of products covered by Stabex to include some processed 
vegetable or mineral products m•y also provide an incentive for the development 
df certain processing industries in the ACP States and eliminat~ what ha~ often 
been criticized as a stultifying side-effect of~Stabex. 
87. It is too early to assess the success of Sysmin. In so far as the funds 
available can be used to improve the development of primary processing of 
raw materials <see the first two operations in Zambia and Zaire), it should 
have a positive impact on industrialization in the ACP States. 
88. In the low-income developing countries, foreign capital represents 
almost 60% of the value of overall domestic investment1, while for the 
others it currently exceeds 30%. This capital is shared almost equally 
between the public and private sectors. 
89. An improvement in the ACP's own savings would therefore be one source 
of funds. Such savings can be effected as from now by purely internal 
measures <remunerative prices for agriculture, for example) or by an 
improvement in the real value of exported raw materials <which depends 
on the successful outcome of international negotiations). 
I 
90. A primary source of public financial resources is, further, the world 
organizations (World Bank, AID). It is important that, despite the 
worsening crisis and the.self-regarding reaction-of certain'countries, 
this funding .should continue to increase in proportion to the needs. 
1 Source: Industry in the world since 1960: progress and prospects (UNIDO, 1979) 
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~ 91. The methods of public financing under the Lome Conventions were outlined 
in paragraph 48. Each has a specific purpose: venture capital, however, 
seems particularly well-suited to industrial operations, in particular 
through global loans in so far as the SME-SMI are concerned. The available 
appropriations allocated in consequence of political negotiations have 
generally been used up easily. The volume of the fi~anci~l re$ources provides 
and will co~tinue to provide one of the t~eae~st indicati~ns of EEC interest in 
industrial cooperation~ and more generally, evidence of its analysis of ways of 
emerging from the world crisis. 
92. Similar observations could no doubt be· made in respect of bilateral 
agreements linking certain ACP States to certain Member Countries of 
the EEC. However, there is as yet no centralized source of statistics 
at Community level which would make it possible to compare the figures 
involved with those for the Lome Convention. 
93. At least five observations can be made regarding private investment and 
the factors likely to encourage it: 
- a reduction in the present level of interest rates seems in the 
developing countries, as elsewhere, an essential condition for any 
meaningful upturn in private investment; 
-private investment is attracted more readily to areas with existing 
infrastructures and satisfactory environment, the improvement of 
which must therefore be an important objective; 
- the need for foreign senior staff, which increases production costs 
and sometimes discourages investment; this is one more reason for 
giving priority to training; 
-possibilities afforded by the Lome Convention (loans, support measures 
•• ),which are not sufficiently well known to private investors, in 
particular the SME-SMI, should be publicized more widely; 
- the question of security and guarantees on investments - including 
the 'political risks' which certain confidential publications claim to 
assess <nationalization, additional fiscal measures, etc.) - appears to 
be one of the most decisive factors for potential investors; its solution 
requires the introduction of suitable safeguard mechanisms, either linked 
to specific projects, or preferably, resulting from general agreements 
laying down reciprocal undertakings. 
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9~. Finally, the increased snowball effect which may result from the Lome 
Convention- i.e., the growth in co-financing, encouraged by the guarantee 
of the quality of the projects concerned which the Community's participation 
represents - demands a special information and promotion effort on the part 
of finance organizations in the countries with a balance-of-payments surplus, 
essentially the oil-producing countries. 
95. Lastly, it should be observed that the effective utilization of the 
financial resources is a matter which merits at least as much attention as 
the question of their volume. Thus, in many ACP States considerable 
industrial production capacity can be created by simple and. inexpensive operations tq 
rehabilitate existing undertakings or projects which have been poorly 
administered in the past (supply of spare parts, replacement of certain 
machinery, training of technicians or experts>. 
96. The critical problem here is the transfer of technology. For such transfers 
to be possible, a number of conditions must be fulfilled in the recipient's 
country, particularly as regards the problems of training, which will be 
discussed later. It also requires •vectors• - which will in the main be 
the undertakings themselves, which brings us back to the problem of 
investment - but may also be •experts• of various types. 
97. The assistance of industrial experts bringing their technical expertise 
to the recipient state can also be a determining factor in the transfer 
of technology. Their role may be either to identify and evaluate new 
projects - suggesting ways in which they might be implemented - or to 
diagnose and rehabilitate existing industries which are not functioning 
satisfactorily; or again, where factories have been delivered more or less 
ready for production by the foreign investors, their help may be needed to 
make them operational and, initially, in their management, such a role 
possibly including the training of local personnel and technicians. 
98. In this connection, the recent moves in the CID to equip itself with 
a body of experts able to undertake some of the above tasks would seem to be 
worth encouraging, especially since they can reveal new scope for joint 
undertakings. 
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99. However, for the moment the above tasks are usually undertaken by 
consultancy bureaus and groups of engineering consultants, working on the 
basis of private or public, local or foreign initiatives, but who are 
generally from the industrial countries. It seems desirable that there shoutd 
be more organizations of this kind operating with ACP nationals, who are 
acquainted with the special features of the host country <at present only 
four ACP countries - Jamaica, Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe - appear to have 
such agencies>; their creation might be facilitated through joint ventures 
with their European counterparts. 
100. The recipient country must acquire - ultimately at least - a real command 
of a new technology if the transfer is to be effective rather than superficial. 
This means that the technology transferred must be adapted to the recipient's 
capacities <its available raw materials and energy at a specific cost in 
existing workforce, or possibility of training such, not only for the operation 
of plant, but also for maintenance and repair, etc.). Adapted technology 
should not be synonymous with obsolete or lower-performance technology, 
involving sales from the 'North' of outdated machinery; yet this does not 
automatically· rule out the use of such machinery, which can still prove 
very valuabe in countries where the ratio of capital to labour is different. 
101. Having said that, the best way of guaranteeing the suitability of a particular 
. . 
.. technology is for tt to' be either the productofa·multi-disciplinary research 
programme conducted jointly by the donor and the recipient, covering 
both technical and socio-cultural aspects and carried out, if possible, in 
the recipient countryr or, better still, the re~ult of the direct establishment 
of truly indigenous research, at nationat or regional level. 
<d> Ir~ioiog 
102. Training is an essential requirement for inwardly-focussed development. 
It is a pre-condition for sound industrial development. It needs to be 
accomplished by mass programmes <schooling for all children, literacy 
campaigns> backed up at local level by programmes for rural training 
(basic hygiene, the rudiments of agriculture) and technical training 
<making simple tools, maintenance and repair of machines in every day 
use). Advanced level of training should be the pinnacle of as wide and 
comprehensive an education as possible. 
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103. In the context of an industrialization strategy, high-Level training 
should enable a number of existing imbalances in most of the developing 
countries to be redressed. In particular, instead of giving precedence 
to training in Law and the arts - which ultimately Leads to an overgrown 
civil service and still more bloated State bureaucracies- emphasis should 
be Laid on scientific training <economic and technical) to provide these 
countries with the supervisory staff they most need. 
104. Once this body of qualified staff has been trained, it is essential to 
prevent a brain-drain into State adwinistration, or, even worse,· abroad. 
That implies that the corresponding professions must be upgraded, socially 
and financially, and means must be established, possibly at regional Level, 
for retraining qualified people and providing the research required to 
maintain a high professional standard. Such measures would also encourage 
ACP students or trainees to return home once they had completed their 
training in the EEC; at present some decide not to do so. 
105. Technical cooperation, as it too frequently operates at present, should 
be the subject of a rethink. Cooperation by training should replace 
cooperation by substitution: one of the prime objectives of those working 
under a technical cooperation scheme - and one of the proofs of their 
success should be their replacement by nationals of equal competence. 
106. In the same vein, the financing granted under Loml ought to include - or, 
in the case of co-financing, be subject to - the setting-up of training 
programmes whose purpose is to allow the replacement of the greatest 
possible number of foreign technicians. In view of the wage costs involved, 
this would also be to the advantage of the investor in the medium term. 
The process could be furthered by expanding the EEC's scholarships and 
training programme~ which is Ludicrously inadequate at present since only 
about 30 scholarships and 20 traineeships Linked to industry have been granted 
under the Lome I Convention. 
10l Finally, ACP migrant workers in the EEC (approximately 400,000, of whom 
three-quarters Live in the United Kingdom or the Netherlands> 1 could 
make an important contribution to raising the standard of training in their 
1
source: Michel report to the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly, Doc. ACP-EEC/18/80 
(1980) 
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home countries. This would involve agreement on the part of the host 
country to assist in two ways: by helping them during their stay in the 
EEC to maintain contact with their own culture and mother-tongue; and by 
adapting their occupational training to the situation and needs of the 
mother country once the workers have expressed a desire to return home. 
108. The powers of the Committee on Industr~l Cooperation (CIC), as 
defined in Article 78<1> of the Lom{ Convention, should actually be 
deployed in full and should not be confined to supervision of the CID's 
activities, so as to enable it to keep ~nder review all the difficulties 
and measures referred to in the prece ding pages. 
109. It would also seem essential that both the trade unions and employers' 
organizations be allowed to speak on the problems of industrial cooperation- not 
or1ly on investment safeguards but also ur1 workers' rights and working conditions -
which concern them directly. For this purpose the 'contracts' envisaged 
in the Loml Convention, which depend on the initiative of the Council of 
Ministers or the Consultative Assembly <Articles 168(6) and 175<7>>, seem 
totally inadquate: they should be formalized through the setting up of a 
kind of Economic and Social Committee with the power to deliver recommenda-
tions and opinions. 
110. The analysis of the situation and the problems of industrialization in 
the ACP States and an assessment of the achievements of industrial 
cooperation under the Lome Conventions- by no means negligible but 
falling far short of expectations- have been presented in this report in 
such a way as to lead naturally to certain recommendations. These have 
been set out in the motion for a resolution drawn up at the.beginning of this 
report and form its last section, headed 'The me~sfor implementation'. 
111 • All the specific measures proposed, aimed at strengthening industrial 
cooperation, fall within a very definite framework: that of a medium-term 
programme for a comprehensive development scheme negotiated in the 
interests of the countries concerned; this development scheme should include 
detailed statistical data on prospects for production and trade ih the 
most sensitive areas of industry as well as priorities for the anticipated 
and foreseeable investment flows. 
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112. At the outset, ACP-EEC relations were based on the concept 'aid', 
sometimes motivated by generosity but, in practice,often paternalistic and 
self-seeking. With increased interdependence and the worsening economic 
crisis, a new approach based on co-development, as outlined above, should 
henceforth inspire those responsible on both sides. What is at stake is a 
particular view of humanity, freedom and human dignity. What is at stake 
are the prospects for peace; do we really believe that poverty, or the arms 
race, can continue for long without provoking a serious crisis? What is 
at stake is our duty to plan for the future and to create the best possible 
chances of emerging from crisis,in the interest of us all. 
- 31 - CA/ CP /337/ rev. 
